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A Section 8 Triumph? 
GREFFE: A SECTION 8 TRIUMPH OR A THORN 
IN THE SIDE OF DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT? 
by 
ALAN YOUNG* 
lNTRODUCfION 
293 
The distribution of illegal drugs has always attracted special atten-
tion from law enforcement officials. Since the enactment of our first 
prohibition on the trade in narcotics in 1908, law enforcement officials 
have constantly bemoaned their powerlessness in combatting the drug 
trade. Through concerted lobbying efforts they have managed to bring 
into place a statutory enforcement scheme that is far more rigorous and 
invasive than that of conventional law enforcement. 1 Even so, official 
dissatisfaction remained. 
Many of the extraordinary powers given to law enforcement officials 
have been abrogated or have recently been struck down for constitutional 
infirmity,2 but there still persists an attitude among state agents that the 
war on drugs is a unique law enforcement concern that necessitates spe-
cial powers and privileges. For the most part the judiciary has concurred 
with this approach; and it is common to see judicial pronouncements like 
the following from R. v. Brezack, [ 1949] O.R. 888, 9 C.R. 73 at 78-79, 96 
C.C.C. 97, [1950] 2 D.L.R. 265 (C.A.): 
Constables have a task of great difficulty in their efforts to check the illegal 
traffic in opium and other prohibited drugs. Those who carry on the traffic 
are cunning, crafty and unscrupulous almost beyond belief. While. therefore, 
*Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, North York, Ontario. 
1 For a discussion of the history of this legislation, see R. Solomon and Melvyn Green, 
"The First Century: The History of Non-Medical Use and Control Policies in Canada, 
1870-1970", in P. Erickson (ed.), Illicit Drug Use In Canada: A Risky Business (1989). 
The somewhat extraordinary powers applicable to narcotics enforcement included whip-
ping, minimum sentences, reverse onuses, warrantless search powers, writ of assistance 
powers, deportation sanctions and limited powers of judicial review. 
2For example, the reverse onus with respect to possession for the purpose of trafficking 
was struck down in R. v. Oakes, [1986) l S.C.R. 103, 50 C.R. (3d) 1, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 
26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, 19 C.R.R. 308, 14 O.A.C. 335, 65 N.R. 87, the minimum sentence 
for importation was struck down in R. v. Smith, [1987] l S.C.R. 1045, 58 C.R. (3d) 193, 
[1987) 5 W.W.R. l, 15 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 40 D.L.R. (4th) 435, 31 
C.R.R. 193, 75 N.R. 321, and the power to search by writ of assistance was repealed by 
the Criminal Law Amendment Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 200. 
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it is important that constables should be instructed that there are limits upon 
their right of search. including search of the person, they are not to be 
encumbered by technicalities in handling the situations with which they often 
have to deal in narcotics cases, which permit them little time for deliberation 
and require the stem exercise of such rights of search as they possess. 
This statement of judicial intent was made in the context of a body 
cavity search that was premised upon the slimmest of justificatory 
grounds. Some 30 years later the issue of justification for body cavity 
searches found its way to the Supreme Court of Canada, and now, in the 
constitutional context, the court may have reversed the long-standing 
trend of the judiciary in paying scant attention to improper or un-
authorized police practices in the investigation of narcotics cases: R. v. 
Greffe, ante, p. 257, also [1990] 3 W.W.R. 577, 73 Alta. L.R. (2d) 97. 
Greffe was found to be carrying about 40 gm of heroin in his anal pas-
sage and, due to violations of the accused's rights under ss. 8 and lO(b) of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the court excluded the 
evidence and entered an acquittal. Dickson C.J.C., in dissent, referred to 
the constitutional violations as being "technical in nature and an example 
of minor police stupidity" (p. 269); however, the majority implicitly 
rejected the notion that constitutional violations should be discounted as 
mere technical breaches simply because they arise in the context of the 
war on drugs. 
Despite the contrasting legal analysis, both the majority and the mi-
nority expressed deep concern over the possibility that obviously guilty 
drug traffickers might escape justice because the "constable blundered". 
Dickson C.J.C. commented that the remedying of the violation of the 
accused's constitutional rights in this case would raise the ire of the 
public because the violation "amounts to the kind of 'technical' violation 
which the general public in the United States frequently derides when an 
unquestionably culpable accused in that country is acquitted of very 
serious charges" (p. 269). Lamer J. was willing to remedy the violations, 
but he clearly stated that he was doing so with "great hesitation given the 
manifest culpability of the appellant of a crime that I consider heinous" 
(p. 292). These expressions of judicial regret might suggest that this case 
is truly a borderline case in which the noble values of the Charter may 
have been needlessly spent; however, on another interpretation one might 
conclude that the type of subterfuge and deceit exercised by the police in 
this case is the very reason why the constitutionalization of procedural 
rights in the criminal process was a needed and desirable development. 
A Section 8 Triumph? 295 
SECTION 8 AS A BARRIER TO CONVICTION IN NARCOTICS CASES 
The Supreme Court of Canada has on numerous occasions excluded 
confessions made by arguably guilty murderers3 without expressing the 
same compunction and reservations expressed in this case. Surely the 
court is not suggesting that murder is a less heinous crime than drug 
trafficking, but rather their reluctance to apply the Charter in the context 
of drug trafficking is a reflection of the legitimate concern that drug traf-
ficking poses unique problems for law enforcement. Every day thou-
sands of passengers arrive in Canada at the various international airports, 
and recent statistics show that air travel remains the predominant mode of 
transporting drugs into Canada.4 It is clear that the police are able to 
intercept only a small percentage of the illicit drugs that are imported by 
means of couriers using air travel, especially when one takes into account 
the furtive methods of an "alimentary canal smuggler"5 like Greffe. The 
difficulties in detecting air travel couriers exist independently of the 
Charter, and the critical question is whether a rigorous application of s. 8 
of the Charter exacerbates an already difficult situation. 
Section 8 of the Charter is an easy scapegoat for law enforcement 
problems. This Charter right imposes certain restrictions upon the ability 
of the police to invade the privacy of one's body or belongings, and com-
mon sense suggests that legal restrictions on the invasive powers of the 
police would make the detection of drug importation at the airport even 
more difficult. In contrast, s. lO(b) of the Charter places no substantive 
obstacles in the way of investigatory detection of narcotics. Assuming 
that the police meet the prerequisites for a constitutionally reasonable 
3See, e.g., Clarkson v. R .. [1986] l S.C.R. 383, 50 C.R. (3d) 289, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 200, 
26 D.L.R. (4th) 493, 19 C.R.R. 209, 69 N.B.R. (2d) 40, 177 A.P.R. 40, 66 N.R. 114; R. v. 
Brydges, 14 C.R. (3d} 129, [1990] 2 W.W.R. 220, 71 Alta. L.R. (2d) 145, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 
330, 103 N.R. 282 (S.C.C.}. 
4The R.C.M.P. note that air travel is the mode of transportation for 88 per cent of the 
heroin, 38 per cent of the cocaine and 30 per cent of the marijuana imported into Canada: 
see R.C.M.P., National Drug Intelligence Estimate 1987/88, pp. 4-9. 
5Technically, Greffe is not an "alimentary canal smuggler", as this term applies only to 
individuals who have swallowed contraband, as opposed to simply placing the contraband 
in a bodily orifice. Nevertheless, I will refer to Greffe as belonging in this category, 
because, whether the smuggler has deposited the drugs in Iris/her internal organs or 
his/her bodily orifices, both scenarios pose unique difficulties for law enforcement. For a 
discussion of drug smuggling by way of bodily concealment, see Note (1~86), 16 Seton 
Hall L. Rev. 763. 
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search, the requirement of providing an accused with a reasonable oppor-
tunity to consult with a lawyer should not prevent a search, but merely 
delay its execution. 6 
Accordingly, when the court noted that the police violated Greffe's 
s. lO(b) rights by not infonning him of his right to counsel before the 
strip-search, this does not in any way suggest that a proper furnishing of 
this right would have prevented the police from ultimately discovering 
the drugs. Of course, there was a remote possibility that counsel would 
have instructed the accused concerning his right to a review of the deci-
sion to conduct a body search, and that upon the review the designated 
official might have barred the search because of the absence of reason-
able and probable grounds. However, the thwarting of the search would 
then, in these circumstances, be premised upon non-compliance with the 
threshold requirements of s. 8. Any way you look at it, s. 8 of the Charter 
is the culprit. 
In order to understand if s. 8 is really a fonnidable obstacle to con-
viction in drug cases, one must compare the constitutionally deficient 
practice of the police in this case with the proper practice that should 
have been employed to comport with the Constitution. In this case the 
police received a "tip" from a confidential infonnant that the accused 
would be bringing drugs into Canada by plane. Assuming that the infor-
mation received by the police was sufficient to constitute reasonable and 
probable grounds, the police would have been entitled to arrest the ac-
cused and then execute a search incident to arrest, or to arrest him and 
keep him under close observation until he passed the contraband through 
his system, or to simply execute a power of search pursuant to the Nar-
cotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1. 
60f course the Supreme Court of Canada has noted in this case and others (see R. v. 
DeBot, [1989) 2 S.C.R. 1140, 73 C.R. (3d) 129, 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 102 N.R. 161 [Ont.]; 
R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495, 67 O.R. (2d) 63, 66 C.R. (3d) 297, 2 T.C.T. 4102, 18 
C.E.R. 227, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 296, 55 D.L.R. (4th) 673, 38 C.R.R. 252, 30 0.A.C. 241, 89 
N.R. 1; and R. v. Strachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980, 67 C.R. (3d) 87, [1989) 1 W.W.R. 385, 
43 C.C.C. (3d) 497, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 673, 37 C.R.R. 335, 90 N.R. 273 [B.C.]) that there is 
a relationship between compliance withs. 8 ands. lO(b), in thats. lO(b) violations can 
affect the reasonableness of a search; however, the relationship is limited to the unique 
circumstances of border searches and consent searches (see DeBot at p. 199), and, in any 
event, as. IO(b) violation that precedes a search will barely satisfy the nexus requirement 
of s. 24(2) (i.e., that the violation resulted in the obtaining of evidence), and the remote 
connection between the violation and the discovery of the evidence would probably result 
in few instances of actual exclusion of the real evidence. 
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Clearly, the availability of these options undercuts the suggestion 
that the police are handicapped in the investigation of drug offences. 
There are nevertheless certain statutory and constitutional limitations im-
posed upon the police in the execution of the search powers under the 
Narcotic Control Act, namely, the Constitution would not permit a war-
rantless search unless the obtaining of a warrant was impracticable. This 
constitutional requirement would not have posed a problem in this case, 
considering that the police had been waiting a week for the accused's 
arrival at the airport. In addition, the scope of the power to search a 
person under the Narcotic Control Act is unclear - the law is unsettled as 
to whether the power to search a person is triggered only by an initial 
search of a place, with the search of persons being incidental to the search 
of the targeted place, or whether the right to search a person is a power 
that exists independently of the power to search a suspected location. 
Despite the availability of these options, with the few stated limita-
tions, the police approached the investigation in a furtive and indirect 
manner. They did not arrest the accused upon his arrival, but rather 
directed him to secondary inspection for a routine customs search in the 
hope that the contraband would be found in his belongings. This indirect 
approach may have been fruitless but in itself is not objectionable. How-
ever, when this approach proved to be of no value, the police adopted a 
rather bizarre method to further their investigation. They arrested the 
accused on unrelated and outstanding warrants for traffic violations. One 
can only assume that this strange and strained arrest was made to thwart 
the accused's exercise of his s. lO(b) rights, in the sense that most in-
dividuals arrested for traffic violations would not consider consulting 
with a lawyer, even after being informed of this right, due to the trivial 
nature of the charges. On the basis of this unusual arrest the police then 
arrogated to themselves the right to conduct the most intrusive of all pos-
sible searches - a body cavity search. 
Clearly, one cannot gainsay the court's conclusion that an arrest for 
traffic offences cannot justify a body cavity search;7 however, can it not 
still be argued that the pretext arrest was simply a foolish and impulsive 
manoeuvre by the police that was not altogether that insidious, because 
7Tue majority judgment on this point suggests that the earlier decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158, 74 C.R. (3d) 316, 53 
C.C.C. (3d) 257 [Que.], placing few limits on the power to search incident to arrest, must 
be narrowly interpreted: see Stuart, Annotation to Cloutier v. Langlois (1990), 74 C.R. 
(3d) 318. 
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the police in fact possessed the requisite authority to search? That is to 
say, if the police met the threshold requirement of having reasonable and 
probable grounds, even though they chose a rather unorthodox manner to 
act upon their belief, this should be of no consequence, because they 
could have exercised the intrusive power by the more conventional ap-
proaches mandated both by statute and by the Constitution. 
Unfortunately, this was not just a case of unorthodox investigative 
methods. This was a case in which the court called into question the very 
justification for any of the options pennitted by law. The court held that 
the record did not adequately disclose that the police possessed reason-
able and probable grounds to believe that the accused was in possession 
of a narcotic. The record did disclose that the police acted upon "confi-
dential infonnation received and background investigation", but no fur-
ther evidence was adduced to elaborate upon this information. The lower 
courts had assumed that the police possessed the requisite grounds be-
cause whatever information they possessed proved to be correct, in that 
the accused was actually found in possession of narcotics. Lamer J. cor-
rectly rejects this ex post facto justification - allowing the fruits of a 
search to justify the initial intrusion would entirely undermine any protec-
tion that individuals have against unreasonable search and seizure. Per-
haps the infonnation received by the police was substantial enough to 
constitute reasonable and probable cause; however, Lamer J. is surely 
correct in refusing to speculate upon the content of the infonnation that 
the Crown could have easily adduced into evidence. 
In both its pre-Charter and its post-Charter form, the law is well 
settled in its requirement that the police provide an adequate foundation 
for the assessment of reasonable and probable grounds. Mere conclusory 
assertions are never adequate. In their assessment of reasonable and 
probable grounds, the police are entitled to rely upon situational clues 
that they observe, or upon information received from confidential infor-
mants. Information that is received from confidential informants poses 
distinctive problems, in that this second-hand infonnation is subject to 
the abuse that the informant may be mistaken, deceitful or bent upon 
revenge. Accordingly, the law requires that these "tips" possess suf-
ficient substance to elevate them beyond mere gossip or rumour. The 
police may act upon this information only if the informant has proved 
reliable in the past, if the information is credible or subject to corrobora-
tion and if the informant discloses the basis of the acquisition of the in-
fonnation, so that it has an air of reality. The courts adopt a "totality of 
circumstance" approach in that weakness in one factor of assessment 
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(e.g., an informant of questionable reliability) may be compensated by 
strengths in other factors (e.g., a detailed tip that was acquired through 
direct contact with the suspect). 8 
The requirement of strict scmtiny of second-hand "tips" is not a 
mere technical obstacle, but is the essence of the protection against un-
reasonable search and seizure. In the seminal case of Hunter v. Southam 
Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (sub nom. Can. (Dir. of Inves-
tigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch) v. Southam Inc.), 
[1984] 6 W.W.R. 577, 33 Alta. L.R. (2d) 193, 27 B.L.R. 297, 84 D.T.C. 
6467, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641, 2 C.P.R. (3d) l, 9 C.R.R. 
355, 55 A.R. 291, 55 N.R. 241, the Supreme Court of Canada placed the 
objective criterion of probable cause in proper perspective. It was said 
that "The state's interest in detecting and preventing crime begins to pre-
vail over the individual's interest in being left alone at the point where 
credibly-based probability replaces suspicion" (p. 120 (C.R.)). The re-
quirement of reasonable and probable grounds has instrumental and in-
trinsic value. It prevents the police from engaging in "random virtue 
testing"9 and provides a clear demarcation of the boundary of the individ-
ual's right to privacy free from unwarranted state intrusion. 
If one characterizes the Greffe case as one in which the police lacked 
reasonable and probable grounds, then it would be unfair to accuse the 
court of allowing a clearly guilty drug trafficker to escape justice on a 
mere technicality. Probable cause constitutes the primary justification for 
most state intrusions, and to relegate this element to the domain of tech-
nicality is to trivialize the entire enterprise of rights in the criminal 
process. In his dissenting judgment, Dickson C.J.C. does not suggest that 
the requirement of reasonable and probable grounds is a mere technical-
ity; rather his concern lies in the fact that the police were not acting capri-
ciously or on a whim in detaining and searching the accused. He recog-
nized that their assertion of probable cause was lacking, but he also 
8For a review of the leading cases dealing with the assessment of reasonable and 
probable grounds as based upon infonnants' tips, see lllint>is v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 76 
L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct 2317 (1983). rehearing denied 463 U.S. 1237, 77 L. Ed. 2d 
1453, 104 S. Ct 33; R. v. Pastro (1988), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 485, 39 C.R.R. 108, 66 Sask. 
R. 241 (C.A.); R. v. DeBot (1986), 54 C.R. (3d) 120, 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207, 26 C.R.R. 275, 
17 0.A.C. l41, affirmed supra, note 6. 
9Th.is expression is taken from Lamer J. in his description of the objectionable aspects 
of police entrapment in R. v. Mack, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903, 67 C.R. (3d) 1 at 31, [1989] 1 
W.W.R. 577, 44 C.C.C. (3d) 513, 37 C.R.R. 277, 90 N.R. 173 [B.C.]. 
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recognized that "this is not a case where there was no evidence at all" (p. 
266). 
The real dilemma in this case relates to the recurring problem of 
what options are available to the police when they have an articulable 
suspicion that criminal activity is under way yet their suspicions cannot 
be elevated to probable cause.10 The current approach to s. 8 of the 
Charter is rather blunt and crude - if the police have reasonable and prob-
able grounds, they may act, and if their information falls short of this 
standard then they cannot undertake any intrusive activity at all. Amer-
ican jurisprudence recognizes a middle ground. Since the seminal case of 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), the 
United States Supreme Court has recognized that the police may under-
take a brief investigatory detention if they have a reasonable suspicion 
that falls short of probable cause. 
The Terry "stop and frisk" doctrine empowers the police by enabling 
them to take mildly intrusive action in order to confirm or dispel their 
reasonable suspicions. The doctrine is not without its share of problems. 
The development of the doctrine has been rather unruly, and the brief 
investigatory detention permitted under the doctrine has expanded to ac-
commodate police activity of greater intrusiveness.1 1 Even with this 
middle ground power based upon reasonable suspicion, American law 
enforcement officials have encountered difficulties in investigating the 
activities of drug couriers arriving at airports. 
In deciding to investigate passengers arriving at airports, the police 
rely upon "tips", as in the Greffe case, or upon the notorious "drug 
1
°'Thi.s problem presented itself in a different context in R. v. Duguay, (1989] l S.C.R. 
93, 67 O.R. (2d) 160, 67 C.R. (3d) 252, 46 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 46, 38 C.R.R. l, 
31 O.A.C. 177, 91 N.R. 201, in which the police had a "h\lllch" about the guilt of a 
munber of suspects but mistakenly decided to exercise the power of arrest for inves-
tigatory purposes. It is clearly wrong for the police to exercise the intrusive power of 
arrest on less than reasonable and probable grounds; however, what is left unanswered by 
this case is the issue of available investigatory options in cases in which the police possess 
a reasonable suspicion but not one that can be elevated to probable cause. 
11See the gradual expansion of the doctrine in the cases of Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983); U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 77 L. Ed. 2d 
110, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983); U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 105 S. Ct. 
1568 (1985). 
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courier proftles". 12 The profile is an amalgam of factors concerning the 
appearance of passengers, the circumstances of their travel plans and 
their activities in the airport. It is a crude barometer of suspicious activity 
that has little predictive value and can potentially apply to any traveller 
who exhibits any signs of nervousness. Nevertheless, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that the profile can constitute reasonable suspi-
cion, thus allowing for a brief detention for the purposes of questioning 
or to have luggage sniffed by dogs trained in drug detection: U.S. v. 
Sokolow, 109 S. Ct 1581 (1989). Allowing the "stop and frisk" doctrine 
to apply based upon the profile does substantially facilitate the inves-
tigation of narcotics offences. but it is still rather ineffective in combat-
ting "alimentary canal smugglers" such as Greffe. 
The United States Supreme Court has not allowed these smugglers 
to evade investigation by reason of their clever and dangerous acts of 
concealing drugs in their bodies. In the case of U.S. v. Montoya de 
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381, 105 S. a. 3304 (1985), they 
expanded the "stop and frisk" doctrine beyond recognition. In that case, 
the accused arrived at the Los Angeles airport on a flight from Colombia. 
Upon questioning at customs, suspicions were raised because of her 
evasive answers and bizarre travel plans. On the basis of this suspicion 
(which the court assumed to be reasonable) she was taken for a pat-down 
and a strip-search. Noticing an unusual firmness in her abdominal region, 
the police requested that she undertake an X-ray, but she declined, be-
cause of her claim that she was pregnant. Accordingly, she was placed in 
a small room with a wastebucket, and the authorities waited until "her 
peristaltic functions produced a monitored bowel movement" (p. 394). 
The court noted her "heroic efforts to resist the usual calls of nature" (p. 
387). and after some 16 hours the police finally obtained a warrant au-
thorizing both an X-ray and a rectal examination. In the end it was dis-
covered that she had swallowed 88 balloons, containing 528 gm of 
cocaine. 
12For a discussion of the operation of the drug courier profile, see C. Becton, ''The 
Drug Courier Profile: 'All Seems Infected that Th' Infected Spy, As All Looks Yellow to 
the Jaundic'd Eye'" (1987), 65 North Carolina L. Rev. 417; P. Greenberg. "Drug Courier 
Profiles, Mendenhall and Reid: Analyzing Police Intrusions on Less than Probable Cause" 
(1981), 19 Amer. Crim. L. Rev. 49. See also R. v. Gladstone, 47 C.R. (3d) 289, [1985] 6 
W.W.R. 504, 22 C.C.C. (3d) 151, 18 C.R.R. 99 (B.C.C.A.), for a discussion of the profile 
in the Canadian context. 
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The dissenting judges called this a "disgusting and saddening epi-
sode at our Nation's border" (p. 394). They accepted that air travellers 
can be routinely subjected to questioning, pat-downs and luggage search-
es, but recoiled at the suggestion that someone can be held for 16 hours 
based upon a mere reasonable suspicion. In a rhetorical flourish, the 
dissent stated that "Indefinite involuntary incommunicado detentions 'for 
investigation' are the hallmark of a police state, not a free society"· (p. 
397). The majority were notequally concerned. They stated at p. 391: 
We hold that the detention of a traveller at the border, beyond the scope of 
a routine customs search and inspection, is justified at its inception if customs 
agents, considering all the facts surrounding the traveller and her trip, reason-
ably suspect that the traveller is smuggling contraband in her alimentary 
canal. 
Even though the Terry investigatory detention contemplated only a brief, 
non-intrusive detention, the court stated that they rejected any "hard-and-
fast time limits" (p. 392), and introduced a temporal restriction of such 
great flexibility that this middle ground investigatory aid has become vir-
tually indistinguishable from the full-scale search based upon probable 
cause. 
Turning back to the circumstances of the Greffe case, the issue for 
future consideration concerns police powers in the face of received infor-
mation that falls short of reasonable and ,probable grounds. Assuming that 
the "tip" received by the police at least constituted reasonable suspicion 
of Greffe's criminality (and assuming that the police do not engage in bad 
faith actions such as a pretext arrest), the question raised is whether the 
police are entitled to act upon the reasonable suspicion or whether they 
have to let Greffe slip through their fingers. Canadian law would not 
permit the same abusive action as was taken in the Hernandez case, 
supra. In that case the accused was held incommunicado for 16 hours, 
whereas our regime of rights would require that she be pennitted to con-
sult a lawyer once the police decided to detain her in order to conduct a 
strip-search. Section lO(b) is triggered by detention, whereas Miranda 
warnings are triggered only by "custodial interrogation".13 
13See Miranda v. Arizona; Vignera v. New York; Westover v. U.S., 384 U.S. 436 at 
447, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R. 3d 974 (1966), rehearing denied 385 
U.S. 890 (sub nom. CaJ.ifornia v. Stewart), 17 L. Ed. 2d 121, 87 S. Ct. 11; California v. 
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1275, 103 S. Ct 3517 (1983). 
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As a minimum safeguard, it is thus clear that under the Charter the 
police will not be permitted to act in an intrusive manner without provid-
ing an opportunity to consult counsel. However, this safeguard does not 
address the issue of whether any intrusive activity premised upon a rea-
sonable suspicion can be undertaken in the first place. Admittedly, the 
law is unsettled, but certain propositions can be stated with some cer-
tainty: 
1. If the police decide to detain the air traveller based upon reason-
able suspicion, this may constitute an arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the 
Charter. This may not be the case if the detention is brief and non-
intrusive, but will likely be the case if the detention amounts to a de facto 
arrest: Duguay, supra, note 10. 
2. More specifically, it is clear that, if the traveller is required to 
undertake a strip-search, then this will be a detention and thus s. 9 prob-
lems will be triggered: Simmons, supra, note 6. 
3. With respect to the powers of search, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada has recognized that the safeguards of Hunter v. Southam, supra, must 
be applied contextually; therefore, in the context of a border search the 
safeguards will be reduced somewhat. The extent of the reduction is 
unclear; however, the court did approve of the standard of "reasonable 
cause to suppose" contained in the old Customs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-40 
[repealed R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), s. 212(3)]: Simmons, supra, note 
6. This cryptic phrase may be seen as allowing for searches at the border 
based upon reasonable suspicion. 
4. However, not all searches are commensurate for purposes of 
Charter analysis. Some searches are clearly more intrusive than others, 
and it is recognized that "when the search threatens his bodily integrity, 
the relevant standard may be a different one": Hunter, supra, at p. 120 
(C.R.). The relevant standard to be applied is not clear, but surely in-
vasions of bodily integrity will not be pennitted upon reasonable suspi-
cion and perhaps not even upon the standard of probable cause. 
Accordingly, it can be seen that, in the context of the border, the 
police may not necessarily be handicapped when they possess only rea-
sonable suspicion. They would probably be allowed to conduct searches 
of a minor nature to accompany their power to question; however, the 
rectal examination undertaken in the Greffe case would probably be pro-
hibited unless the police had clear and convincing reasons to conduct this 
major intrusion. Finally, there is also an unresolved issue looming in the 
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background, in that the current jurisprudence may result in the charac-
terization of any body search based upon less than reasonable and prob-
able grounds as being an arbitrary detention. 
One should not have to speculate upon the scope of police powers, 
and the current uncertainty in the law underscores the need for legislative 
intervention. A clear and detailed statutory framework is needed both to 
empower the police and to protect the individual. The current uncertainty 
means that the respective rights and obligations of police and individuals 
are being detennined on a case-by-case basis through the unpredictable 
and open-ended application of the Charter's exclusionary rule. Both the 
state and the individual will find out if their respective rights and/or pow-
ers are worthy of protection only by an after-the-fact judicial inquiry into 
whether the state action brings the administration of justice into dis-
repute. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has attempted to structure the discre-
tionary elements of the exclusionary rule by the enumeration of three sets 
of factors that the court must explore in their detennination of whether 
the administration of justice has been brought into disrepute.14 The first 
factor, and perhaps the primary one, relates to the implications that the 
nature of the evidence obtained by t.J:ie Charter violation may have on the 
fairness of the trial. This has resulted in the controversial division of 
evidence into two distinct categories/ conscripted and real evidence, with 
the latter category in effect being given less protection.15 In fact, the 
criteria advanced by the Supreme Court of Canada seem to relegate the 
right in s. 8 to a position of being an inferior right because its breach can 
result in the obtaining of only pre-existing real evidence. 
After the articulation of the real/conscripted evidence distinction, 
numerous appellate courts have been reluctant to grant remedies for s. 8 
violations, because the collection of real evidence is deemed not to affect 
the accused's right to a fair trial. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada 
has refused to exclude real evidence obtained as a result of s. 8 violations 
14See R. v. Collins, [1987) 1 S.C.R. 265, 56 C.R. (3d) 193, [1987] 3 W.W.R. 699, 13 
B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 38 D.L.R. (4th) 508, 28 C.R.R. 122, 74 N.R. 276, in 
which the court suggests that the factors to be considered can be lumped into three 
categories: (1) fairness of the trial; (2) seriousness of the Charter violation; and (3) effect 
of exclusion on the administration of justice. 
15For a critique of this distinction, see R.J. Delisle, "Collins: An Unjustified Distinc-
tion" (1987), 56 C.R. (3d) 216. 
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on a number of occasions because of this distinction. 16 However, in 
recent cases the Supreme Court has excluded real evidence due to the 
flagrant nature of the Charter violation. In R. v. Genest, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
59, 67 C.R. (3d) 224, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 37 C.R.R. 252, 19 Q.A.C. 163, 
91 N.R. 161, and in the Greffe case, real evidence obtained as a result of 
a pattern of disregard of Charter rights has resulted in exclusion. These 
recent cases show that s. 8 will not be treated as a right that attracts no 
remedy, although it is apparent that the police can violate s. 8 rights with 
less fear of losing probative evidence. 
In conclusion, it can be stated that s. 8 does not present an insur-
mountable obstacle to the effective enforcement of narcotics laws. Even 
with a rigorous and strict application of s. 8, the police may still rely upon 
the fact that real evidence will .rarely be excluded in the absence of egreg-
ious circumstances. The Grefje case is significant in that it clearly sends 
out a message that the absence of reasonable and probable grounds is not 
a mere technical violation but rather a violation of substance that can lead 
to exclusion of evidence. Nevertheless, the case also has a disconcerting 
side, in that one must ask why the police felt the need to employ decep-
tion and subterfuge. The simple answer may be that this shows bad faith 
on the part of officers who have little regard for the rights contained in 
the Charter. However, it may be more likely that the police simply did 
not know with certainty what was permitted and what was prohibited in 
tenns of investigation after the receipt of infonnation that fell short of 
reasonable and probable grounds. 
The Greffe case may be significant in that it rescues s. 8 from the 
danger of being relegated to the position of an inferior right, yet the case 
does little to answer the question of what is pennitted in the absence of 
probable cause. Perhaps the court is not the appropriate institution for 
establishing a code of police powers, but, in the absence of legislative 
initiative, cases like this one will only serve as a bandage to repair the 
l6see R. v. Hamill, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 301, 56 C.R. (3d) 220, [1987] 3 W.W.R. 726, 13 
B.C.L.R. (2d) 24, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 110, 38 D.L.R. (4th) 611, 28 C.R.R. 148, 75 N.R. 149; 
R. v. Sieben. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 295, 56 C.R. (3d) 225, [1987] 3 W.W.R. 722, 13 B.C.L.R. 
(2d) 30, 32 C.C.C. (3d) 574, 38 D.L.R. (4th) 427, 28 C.R.R. 145, 74 N.R. 271; R. v. 
Simmons, supra, note 6; R. v. Jacoy, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 548, 66 C.R. (3d) 336, [1989] 1 
W.W.R. 354, 2 T.C.T. 4120, 18 C.E.R. 258, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 46, 38 C.R.R. 290, 89 N.R. 61 
[B.C.J; R. v. Strachan, supra, note 6. In these cases the court also relied upon the factor of 
good faith in deciding to admit the evidence; therefore, it is difficult to say with certainty 
that the primary factor was simply that the evidence obtained was real evidence. 
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damage caused by unauthorized state intrusions that come to light in 
cases that manage to surface in the Supreme Court of Canada on a piece-
meal basis. The daily interactions between state officials and individuals 
at airports remain fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty. 
